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This paper investigates the allocation of R&D subsidies given to start-ups. Considering the 
coexistence of various R&D project schemes, we take an aggregate view and analyze the 
determinants of the receipt of (any) R&D subsidies within the first three business years of the 
start-ups. We argue that policymakers and funding authorities follow a strategy of “picking 
the winner”. Analyzing a unique data set of start-ups in the East German state of Thuringia, 
we conduct logistic regressions and find ambiguous support. R&D subsidies are given to 
start-ups with innovative business ideas, especially academic spin-offs. On the other hand, the 
ambitions and the patent stock of the founder(s) do not decide the receipt of R&D subsidies. 
These insights into the overall allocation of R&D subsidies are important since they have 
implications for policy effectiveness and efficiency. The implied difficulties of policy 
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1. Introduction 
Policy measures which aim to foster innovative activity in young and/or small firms have 
become increasingly popular among policymakers. Screening relevant policy programs 
delivers a great variety of different schemes on the regional, national and European level
1. 
This points to a major issue in policy making: the targeting of programs. Targeting is defined 
as designing policy programs with respect to certain target groups. Looking at both regional 
and national support schemes that are targeted at private research and development (R&D), 
Blanes and Busom (2004) find that funding authorities pursue different allocation rules.  
The allocation of subsidies has important implications for policy effectiveness and 
efficiency. First, the distinguishing characteristics of subsidized and non-subsidized ventures 
have to be identified to estimate the effectiveness of R&D subsidies. Otherwise, better 
(worse) performance of subsidized projects might be attributable to different pre-treatment 
characteristics. Second, the targeting of policy measures also decides the extent and the 
manner of crowding out effects. Subsidies give recipients an artificial competitive edge. 
Therefore, they have the potential to keep inefficient recipients alive and/or to induce a 
crowding out of non-subsidized firms. In order to minimize these distortions, subsidies should 
be targeted at truly “good” firms (Shane, 2009). 
Previous studies analyzing subsidy allocation schemes mainly focus on one single 
program (e.g., Aschoff, 2008). Given the coexistence of various programs, we take an 
aggregate view on the allocation of R&D subsidies. Does this variety of programs with 
different target groups translate into systematic differences between subsidized and non-
subsidized start-ups and their founders? Or does the variety of programs conceal that there is 
actually no overall policy focus? 
These questions are addressed by this paper’s focus on the allocation of R&D 
subsidies to start-ups in the East German state of Thuringia. Our representative sample allows 
us to take an aggregate view of the allocation of R&D subsidies and thus enables us to make 
generalizations from single programs which often change their designs over time. In order to 
get unbiased results only those subsidized and non-subsidized start-ups which are engaged in 
R&D are examined. Our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the economic 
rationale for the targeting of R&D subsidies. Assuming a strategy of “picking the winner”, 
hypotheses regarding the characteristics of subsidized firms are derived. We use data from the 
Thuringian Founder Study which is introduced in section 4. The determinants of the receipt of 
                                                 
1 An overview about currently available programs gives the online database http://www.foerderdatenbank.de/, 
administered by the German government. 
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R&D subsidies are examined with the help of a logistic regression (section 5). Section 6 
discusses the results and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Targeting of R&D Subsidies: Economic Rationales and Policy Implementation 
This section begins with the rationale for the targeting of R&D subsidies and follows up with 
how policy targeting can be implemented in praxis. 
 
Economic rationales 
The rationale for R&D policy programs is found in the presumed existence of neoclassical 
market failures (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 2002). Conversely, system failures, as discussed in neo-
Schumpeterian approaches, are held responsible for an insufficient amount of innovative 
activity, also justifying certain policy measures (Chaminade and Edquist, 2005; Lundvall et 
al., 2002). 
Referring to the somewhat traditional market failure approach, positive external effects 
resulting from innovative activity provide a first rationale for public policy intervention. A 
second rationale for policy intervention stems from capital market imperfections: mainly due 
to uninsurable risk and information asymmetries R&D projects are not likely to receive the 
same funding conditions as normal investment and not all R&D projects are likely to attract 
adequate funds from private sources. 
If entrepreneurs cannot completely appropriate the returns from innovative activity 
and/or cannot raise the funds for R&D investments at reasonable costs, they invest in R&D at 
a socially suboptimal level. This implies that firms either do not invest in R&D at all or 
conduct projects at a smaller scale. Then, subsidies reduce the costs and uncertainty of private 
R&D activity and thereby aim to induce firms to undertake R&D that would otherwise be 
unprofitable (Wallsten, 2000). The framework for most evaluations is captured by the concept 
of additionality which focuses on additional R&D activity that should be stimulated by public 
R&D funds (Luukkonen, 2000).  
Based on that reasoning, those projects should be funded, which yield high social 
returns (i.e. returns above the risk-adjusted opportunity costs of capital) but would not be 
started in the absence of subsidies, because the private returns are not expected to exceed the 
risk-adjusted opportunity costs of capital (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). The funding of 
inframarginal projects should be avoided because they are expected to be privately profitable 
and therefore are pursued anyway. In this case, the subsidization would just form a transfer 
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payment (without any additionality) and would not have any allocative effect – thus 
constituting windfall gains. 
  However, the identification of the private and social returns of an R&D project 
requires detailed information about highly uncertain outcomes. Policymakers and program 
officials have to quantify private and social returns ex-ante, a monumental if not unsolvable 
task considering the uncertainty of R&D activities as well as the difficulties to identify and 
quantify diffuse spillovers (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000).  
Another line of reasoning considers cooperative or collective innovative activities 
being superior to those activities performed in isolation (Edquist, 2001). Such a systemic view 
claims that due to the division of labor, cooperative R&D projects with other companies, 
customers or researchers are more promising. Systemic failures in the sense that innovators do 
not actively search for a cooperation partner (problem of intermediation) or are afraid of a 
partner’s non-reciprocal behavior in knowledge exchange (problem of reciprocity) may serve 
an anchoring point for policy intervention. Subsidies for cooperative R&D projects would 
encourage the search for appropriate partners and/or dampen (or compensate for) any fear of 
non-reciprocity (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). Hence, R&D co-operations should be more 
liable to be subsidized. Here the focus is quite clearly on those marginal projects which do not 
get activated because of system failures. 
Equivalent to the problems raised by identifying private and social outcomes of R&D 
projects are the challenges of identifying and quantifying systemic failures. Again, 
considering the uncertainty involved in R&D projects as well as measuring the exchange of 
knowledge spillovers, this task is not easily, if at all, being performed in praxis. 
 
Policy implementation and “picking the winner strategy” 
Facing these information problems, we argue that the actual targeting of R&D support 
schemes does not focus on identifying malfunctions in markets or systems or on finding 
marginal projects, but rather follows a strategy of “picking the winner”. When first looking at 
established firms, evidence for a policy focus on the most promising and best-equipped firms 
has been found for a large German R&D project funding scheme (Aschhoff, 2008). 
Policymakers and program officials focus on ventures that promise to favorably contribute to 
employment growth and structural change.  
There are four additional arguments in favor of a policy approach of “picking the 
winner”. First, the focus of R&D funds to these presumably truly “good” firms intends to 
minimize substitution effects, i.e. the crowding out of non-subsidized competitors. Subsidies 
give beneficiaries an artificial competitive edge and in this way equalize ex-ante less efficient 
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and more efficient firms. If only truly good firms receive subsidies (crowding out less 
efficient firms at any rate), the resulting market distortions will be minimal (Shane, 2009)
2. 
Second, the strategy of picking likely winners may direct funds to particular future 
technologies, e.g. biotechnology (Fier and Heneric, 2005). Third, R&D activity is inherently 
risky (Arrow, 1962). As a result from this stochastic effect, the subsidization of R&D projects 
will ineluctably include failures. Public choice theory suggests that a strong political 
commitment is required to justify the subsidization of failed projects. Therefore, policymakers 
and funding authorities are induced to pick winners, i.e. to focus on projects with a high 
probability of success rather than funding projects with higher expected returns but a lower 
probability of success (Stiglitz and Wallsten, 2000). Finally, the certification of “good” 
projects to potential private investors might be a side-effect of a selective policy approach. 
Lerner (1999) argues that public funds certify the quality of their recipients and thereby attract 
private investors. 
The suggested identification of good firms seems to be a task which can be performed 
rather easily in the case of already existing firms – just look at their performance in the past. 
However, when newly founded firms are on the policy agenda this does not work – except in 
the case of serial entrepreneurship. A look at a more general pattern of successful 
entrepreneurship is applicable here. Entrepreneurship research has identified various 
determinants of new venture success and thus provides guidelines for a strategy of “picking 
the winner” (Shane, 2009). Policymakers and funding authorities should allocate public R&D 
funds according to the following pre-treatment characteristics:  
  Novelty of the business idea: The innovativeness of a start-up can be regarded as a key 
determinant of positive external effects, since innovative ventures commercialize 
knowledge and thereby contribute to diversity, increase competition, and foster economic 
growth (Fritsch, 2008). This is reflected by their relatively higher contribution to structural 
change in the long-run (Baptista and Preto, 2006). In particular, academic spin-offs which 
are often headed by faculty or research staff of the originating research institution provide 
an effective means to apply scientific research to commercial ends (Roberts, 1991; Shane, 
2004). 
  Ambitions at the beginning of the first business year: Small business managers’ 
aspirations to expand their business activities are positively related to actual growth 
(Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Similarly, Autio (2005) finds disproportional employment 
                                                 
2 However, there are still distortions arising from raising taxpayer’s money to finance the subsidy as well as 
deadweight losses arising from screening applicants. 
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effects for high-expectation entrepreneurs
3. Although these highly ambitious 
entrepreneurs represent only 3% to 17% of all entrepreneurs (depending on the country), 
they account for up to 80% of total expected jobs by all entrepreneurial activity (Autio, 
2005). 
  Resource strength of the founding project: The accumulation of knowledge as captured by 
founders’ previous patents shows the resource-strength and the potential to innovate (Fier 
and Heneric, 2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2007). Additionally, the resource base of a start-up as 
proxied by the number of founders (single versus team start-ups) (Kamm et al., 1990; 
Lechler, 2001) and the size of initial capital is positively related to various performance 
measures (Van Praag et al., 2005). 
However, a potential emphasis on probable winners might be diluted by information 
asymmetries and distorted incentives of policymakers, funding authorities, and applicants 
(Public Choice considerations). First, applicants have much better information about their 
projects and expectantly present their project to increase the chances of approval (adverse 
selection). Second, rather than pursuing the public interest, the allocation of R&D subsidies 
might also follow specific interests in the policy process (Hart, 2003; Stiglitz and Wallsten, 
2000). The potential to focus public funds on particular industries might trigger rent-seeking 
activities which might be an explanation for an ongoing focus of policymakers on the 
manufacturing sector (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2001). In sum, information asymmetries as well as 






The Thuringian Founder Study 
Data for this study were collected within the Thuringian Founder Study (Thüringer Gründer 
Studie), an interdisciplinary project on the success and failure of innovative start-ups in the 
East German state of Thuringia. The database draws from the commercial register for 
commercial and private companies (Handelsregister, Abteilung A/B) in Thuringia and 
includes 2,971 start-ups in innovative industries registered between 1994 and 2006. 
Innovative industries, according to ZEW classification (Grupp and Legler, 2000), comprise 
‘advanced technology’ and ‘technology-oriented services’.  
                                                 
3 Autio (2005) defines high-expectation entrepreneurs as those nascent entrepreneurs who aim to employ at least 
20 employees within five years’ time. 
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The survey population consists of 4,215 founders (first registered owner-managers) 
who registered a new entry in the Handelsregister between 1994 and 2006. This design made 
it possible not only to interview founders of active companies but also founders of ventures 
that have failed since inception. We selected a random sample from the survey population so 
3,671 founders of start-ups were contacted. Due to team start-ups this corresponds to 2,604 
new ventures in innovative industries. Between January and October 2008, we conducted 639 
face-to-face interviews with solo entrepreneurs or with one member of a start-up team (a 
response rate of about 25%). The 76 start-ups that turned out not to be genuinely new (e.g., 
they were a new branch or new business area of an existing company) were removed. A 
further 13 interviews had to be deleted due to concerns over interview quality. In order to 
exclude any effects of the German reunification, only start-ups with a first business year later 
than 1993 were considered
4. This reduced the number of valid interviews to 450.  
The structured interviews were personally conducted by the members of the research 
project. We were supported by student research assistants, after being trained in various 
sessions in December 2007. On average, an interview took one and a half hours. The 
interviews covered a broad set of questions regarding socio-demographic and psychological 
data of the founder. Moreover, we asked for founder’s activities along the founding process. 
Economic data focused on the time before the first business year and the first three business 
years. Retrospective data relating to events in founder’s life and to the business history were 
collected using a modified version of the Life-History-Calendar (Belli et al., 2004, Caspi et 
al., 1996), which increases the validity of retrospective data.
5 
 
The sample of investigation 
From the data of the Thuringian Founder Study, the majority of venture set ups in the sample 
(61.2%) reported having conducted R&D within the first three business years. Due to missing 
values for single variables and the exclusion of one outlier
6 we arrive at 243 R&D performing 
start-ups which constitute the sample of investigation in this paper. Public funds in support of 
R&D were given to 106 firms (43.6% of all R&D performing start-ups).  
 
                                                 
4 We defined the first business year as the time when accounting started either because of obligations from the 
commercial register or because of first revenues. This does not necessarily correspond to the date of registration 
in the Handelsregister. 
5 The Life-History-Calendar is a method developed by psychologists and sociologists and is based on the 
principles of the autobiographic memory. This means that – in a first step – we asked interviewees about the 
timing of well-known events (e.g. marriage, birth of children). In a second step, these events served as anchors 
for less well represented events (e.g. first interest in entrepreneurship). 
6 We have to discard one outlier which has a patent stock of 148 patents, almost the triple amount of the start-up 
with the second highest patent stock. 
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Additional data 
For the data on the patent stock, we accessed the database of the German patent information 
system (DEPATIS) provided by the German Patent and Trade Mark Office. For each 
interviewed start-up, we looked for patent applications where the founder(s) and/or partner(s) 
were named as inventors. We then calculated the sum of patent applications within the last 




The dependent variable R&D Subsidy describes the take-up of R&D subsidies within the first 
three business years. The dummy variable is coded 1 if the respective start-up received R&D 
subsidies and 0 otherwise. Table 1 shows the independent variables, their definitions and 
hypothesized directions:  
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Novelty 
(+) 
The novelty of the business idea refers to the scope of the newness of the business idea. 
Possible answers were no novelty (0), regional or local (1), supra-regional but national 
(2), European (3) or global novelty (4). 
Academic Spin-off 
(+) 
Academic spin-offs were coded as a dummy variable with 1 denoting start-ups where the 
business idea evolved from previous employment at a university or research institute 
(academic spin-off) and with 0 otherwise. 
Goals 
(+) 
Four items build up the variable goals  at the beginning of the first business year. 
Interviewees were given four contradictory pairs with a 5 level scale in-between. They 
had to classify their goals at the beginning of the first business year given the following 
pairs: working entirely cost-covering vs. to realize much profit (1); to earn one’s living 
vs. to become rich (2); to be a small provider vs. to become market leader (3): to 
generate constant revenues vs. to generate constantly rising revenues (4). The mean of 
these answers was build for each observation. 
Team 
(+) 
Team start-ups were defined as new ventures where more than one person was actively 
involved in the founding process and was intended to become an owner of the company. 
We code a dummy variable with 0 in the case of a single founder, and with 1 in the case 
of a team start-up. 
Patent stock 
(+) 
The patent stock is the sum of patent applications of founders and partners within the last 
five years before venture set-up. 
Initial Capital 
(+) 
The amount of initial capital at the beginning of the first business year was asked for 
with the help of the following table: 1,000 EUR or less (1), more than 1,000 to 10,000 
EUR (2), more than 10,000 to 50,000 EUR (3), more than 50,000 to 100,000 EUR (4), 
more than 100,000 to 250,000 EUR (5), more than 250,000 to 500,000 EUR (6), more 
than 500,000 EUR (7). 
Cooperative R&D  If R&D was performed in co-operation with others within the first three business years, 




Dummy variables that capture the time of business start, i.e. the first business year of the 
company when accounting started either because of obligations from the commercial 






Industry-dummies (NACE, 1 digit): 
Chemical industry, metalworking industry, engineering 
Electrical engineering, fine mechanics and optics 




The value for the dummy variable Product is 1 if the start-up offered a product in the 
first three business years and the value is 0 in the case of service companies. 
Table 1: Definition and hypothesized direction of independent variables. 
 
Descriptive statistics of each variable and the correlation matrix can be found in table 2. 
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M  SD  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16) 
(1)  R&D Subsidy  0.436 0.497 -                     
(2)  Novelty  1.794 1.688 0.279 ***  -                               
(3)  Academic Spin-off 0.173 0.379 0.256 ***  0.294 ***  -                           
(4)  Goals  3.221 0.907 0.110 *  0.311 ***  0.058   -                         
(5)  Team  0.691 0.463 0.157 **  0.095   0.258 *** 0.059   -                       
(6)  Patent Stock  1.407 4.555 0.165 **  0.322 ***  0.231 *** 0.153 **  0.086   -                     
(7)  Initial Capital  3.420 1.389 0.105   0.143 **  0.047   0.125 *  0.084   0.149 **  -                   
(8)  Cooperative R&D  0.473 0.500 0.346 ***  0.243 ***  0.221 *** 0.026   0.116 *  0.199 *** 0.059   -                 
(9)  Year 1994-1997  0.391 0.489 0.027   -0.081   -0.188 *** -0.118 *  -0.085   -0.013   -0.065   0.051   -               
(10)  Year 1998-2001  0.337 0.474 0.092   -0.042   0.226 *** 0.024   0.062   0.098   0.038   0.021   -0.572 *** -             
(11)  Year 2002-2006  0.272 0.446 -0.127 **  0.134 **  -0.034   0.104   0.027   -0.090   0.031   -0.079   -0.489 *** -0.436 *** -           
(12)  Nace 2  0.263 0.441 0.039   -0.095   -0.150 **  0.048   0.015   0.065   0.160 **  0.107 *  0.134 **  -0.091   0.050   -         
(13)  Nace 3  0.272 0.446 0.097   0.245 ***  0.088   0.134 **  0.027   0.157 **  0.086   0.181 ***  0.099   0.014   -0.123 *  -0.365 *** -       
(14)  Nace 7  0.374 0.485 -0.063   -0.050   0.119 *  -0.109 *  0.002   -0.116 *  -0.257 *** -0.171 ***  -0.184 *** 0.077   0.120 *  -0.463 *** -0.473*** -     
(15)  Nace x  0.091 0.288 -0.104   -0.150 **  -0.106 *  -0.098   -0.069   -0.148 **  0.055   -0.155 **  -0.047   -0.013   0.065   -0.189 *** -0.193 *** -0.244 ***  -   
(16)  Product  0.337 0.474 0.197 ***  0.196 ***  -0.050   0.126 **  0.025   0.118 *  0.260 *** 0.143 **  0.053   -0.068   0.014   0.186 *** 0.327 *** -0.408 ***  -0.104  - 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; N=243 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
 
 




Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
0.290 ***  0.279 ***  0.292***  0.305***  0.283***  0.255***  Novelty  (0.093)   (0.096)   (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.093)  (0.096) 
1.220 ***  1.222 ***  1.079**  1.285***  1.220***  0.985**  Academic Spin-off  (0.416)   (0.416)   (0.427)  (0.425)  (0.417)  (0.435) 
   0.068           Goals     (0.165)          
     0.482        Team       (0.326)       
       -0.033      Patent Stock         (0.033)     
         0.088    Initial Capital           (0.109)   
           1.169***  Cooperative R&D             (0.305) 
0.818 **  0.836 **  0.878**  0.796**  0.833**  0.756*  Year 1994-1997  (0.376)   (0.379)   (0.382)  (0.378)  (0.378)  (0.387) 
0.851 **  0.853 **  0.882**  0.847**  0.851**  0.833**  Year 1998-2001  (0.387)   (0.387)   (0.391)  (0.387)  (0.387)  (0.396) 
0.343   0.329   0.312  0.378  0.331  0.018  Nace 2  (0.576)   (0.577)   (0.582)  (0.579)  (0.577)  (0.605) 
0.008   -0.007   -0.006  0.041  0.015  -0.327  Nace 3  (0.596)   (0.596)   (0.600)  (0.597)  (0.597)  (0.630) 
0.170   0.175   0.172  0.180  0.214  0.115  Nace 7  (0.559)   (0.559)   (0.565)  (0.560)  (0.563)  (0.583) 
0.825 **  0.825 **  0.829**  0.831**  0.774**  0.848**  Product  (0.335)   (0.335)   (0.337)  (0.336)  (0.341)  (0.347) 
-2.053 ***  -2.256 ***  -2.399***  -2.061***  -2.345***  -2.296***  Constant  (0.575)   (0.759)   (0.636)   (0.575)  (0.683)  (0.601) 
                       
N  243   243  243  243  243  243 
LR chi2  42.478   42.648  44.706 43.438  43.131  57.479 
Prob > chi2  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Mc Fadden´s R²  0.128   0.128  0.134  0.130  0.130  0.173 
Cox-Snell R²  0.160   0.161  0.168  0.164  0.163  0.211 
Nagelkerke R²  0.215   0.216  0.225  0.219  0.218  0.282 
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5. Results 
The results of logistic regressions are displayed in table 3. We run six different models which 
contain the same set of controls and the same two core independent variables Novelty and 
Academic Spin-off, but differ with respect to the other independent variables. In all six models 
we control for the period the new venture was founded, whether the start-up offered a service 
or a product, and for the industry. The time dummies are always significant, indicating a 
decline in the R&D related subsidization of start-ups since 2002. Furthermore, the 
significantly positive dummy variable Product points to a lower likelihood of service 
companies to receive R&D subsidies.
7 The industry dummies never show a significant 
coefficient, indicating that there are no sectors having been more likely to receive a R&D 
subsidy.  
Looking at all six models, the novelty of the business idea (Novelty) as well as the 
dummy variable Academic Spin-off turn out to have both a positive impact on the probability 
of receiving R&D subsidies. Their impact is significant at the 5% and 1% level throughout. 
As their coefficients change only slightly between the six models, we consider this a 
confirmation of the robustness of our results. Our results thus indicate that R&D programs 
allocate funds in favor of start-ups with more innovative/novel ideas and of academic spin-
offs. The focus on more innovative start-ups is likely to be driven by the expectation that they 
show a comparatively higher competitiveness and in consequence success. Having generated 
a global novelty instead of a local novelty makes a start-up less vulnerable to competitors. 
This, however, may be also an argument for expected higher private returns and accordingly  
less need to be subsidized. Therefore, we find an indication for a “picking the winner 
strategy”. 
The case of a higher funding probability of academic spin-offs could be interpreted in 
the same way since basic new insights there show a high degree of novelty. Additionally, one 
has to take into account that supporting academic spin-offs ranks high on the policy agenda 
devoted to generating more economic value out of basic research in academia (Shane, 2004). 
However, by arguing that the step to found a new venture is much more difficult to do for a 
scientist in academia compared to someone having gained business experience elsewhere 
already, academic spin-offs can be interpreted as marginal projects – they would not come 
into existence without appropriate subsidization and an interpretation as a “picking the winner 
strategy” would not apply. 
                                                 
7 This focus of policymakers and economic research on the manufacturing sector has been also pointed out by 
Czarnitzki and Fier (2001). 
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Starting with model 1 as the base model, the previously described variables only, we 
add the independent variable Goal in model 2. The variable turns out to be insignificant, 
indicating no impact of the founders’ ambitions on the probability of being subsidized. This 
implies that the allocation of funds does not follow the expectations and goals of the applying 
entrepreneurs but looks for more hard facts. Those hard facts could be seen in the resource 
strength of the founding project, our third criterion. Models 3, 4 and 5 test the impact of the 
start-ups’ resource strength as denoted by the variables Team, Patent Stock or Initial Capital. 
None of the characteristics of being a Team start-up, the extent of the Patent Stock, or the 
amount of Initial Capital exerts a significant impact on the probability of receiving R&D 
subsidies. Furthermore, likelihood-ratio tests
8 do not indicate any higher explanatory power of 
the extended models 2 to 4 in comparison with the base model (model 1). This again does not 
sustain our “picking the winner” hypothesis. However, the resource strength of the founding 
project will be partly captured by the variable Academic Spin-off, since academic spin-offs are 
mainly launched by highly qualified teams and feature a high patent stock (Shane, 2004).  
In a last step, the variable Cooperative R&D is added (model 6). This variable has a 
highly significant positive impact on the probability of receiving R&D subsidies. A 
likelihood-ratio-test reveals that model 6 has a significant higher explanatory power than the 
base model. A founding project’s access to external resources, as indicated by its engagement 
in cooperative R&D, goes along with a higher probability to receive R&D support. This can 
be interpreted on the one hand in terms of expecting a higher probability of success, 
sustaining our hypothesis. On the other hand, it would not be sustained if firm founding based 
on collaborative R&D indicated comparatively higher returns. If collaborative R&D was 
essential for a new venture, but not pursued without a subsidy, the project was merely 
marginal; again not validating our “picking the winner” hypothesis but rather suggesting 
subsidies’ potential to build winners. However, the variable Cooperative R&D might be 
subject to interdependencies with the dependent variable. A considerable number of R&D 
support programs target cooperative R&D. Hence, cooperative R&D might be a result of the 




                                                 
8 Likelihood-ratio tests are not reported here, but can be obtained from the authors. 
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6. Discussion 
When interpreting our ambiguous support for a policy strategy of “picking the winner” we, 
have to start by analyzing by whom the selectivity is exerted and then what this selectivity 
implies for policy effectiveness.  
 
Sources of selectivity 
Interpreting the positively significant coefficients of collaborative R&D, of academic spin-
offs, and of start-ups selling products versus services, one has to be aware that several R&D 
programs exclusively focus on those criteria and consequently fund only respective projects. 
Since our sample contains enough new ventures not satisfying one or all of these criteria that 
do not receive policy support, the coefficients of collaborative R&D, of academic spin-offs, 
and of start-ups selling products absolutely must show up significantly positive. Hence, our 
positive coefficient covers two conceptually different cases of selectivity, the first being that 
the bias is imposed prior to announcing the tender and a second instance where the bias shows 
up during the selection of projects by the committees. Since both mechanisms are exerted by 
policymakers and/or program officials, they are interchangeably termed as administrative 
(Storey, 2000), agency (Wallsten, 2000) or committee selection (Storey, 2003). More 
tendentiously, Bassi (1984) speaks of “cream-skimming” by program administrators. 
However, we cannot verify whether there are well-defined allocation rules behind particular 
programs, because we lack data on the basis of individual funding schemes. 
  Moreover, not only do policymakers and program officials select beneficiaries of 
R&D support programs but also founders and their start-ups might self-select into the 
programs (Storey, 2000). Since subsidization reduces the costs of R&D, we assume that 
everybody would apply whose expected benefits from the R&D subsidy exceed the costs of 
applying. Figure 1 shows the answers of non-subsidized founders regarding the reasons why 
they did not make use of subsidies. The first two categories, “not available/known” and “no 
interest/need” (representing 38.7% of non-subsidized founders), can be subsumed as self 
selection of founders and might be explained by founders’ (self-perceived) costs of applying 
for public R&D funds (e.g. time and effort spent on getting informed about funding schemes 
and application procedures). The other categories can be more or less regarded as committee 
selection. The highest fraction of non-subsidized founders (35.0%) reported that overly 
complicated application procedures prevented them from applying. This category, to some 
extent, blurs with the fourth category (“not eligible, therefore not applied”) which both 
characterize different stages of dropping out along the information and application process. 
The applications of 8.8% of non-subsidized founders had been rejected, indicating clear-cut 
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committee selection. The reasons for non-subsidization might be biased, because we only 
asked founders of non-subsidized start-ups, who still conducted R&D. However, we do not 
have data about start-ups which applied unsuccessfully and, therefore, did not conduct R&D 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The percentages do not add up to 100% due to refusals; N=137. 
Fig. 1: Reasons for non-subsidization 
 
Policy effectiveness and efficiency 
The analyzed allocation of R&D subsidies does not assert whether they could effectively 
promote additional R&D activity. Even if there was a clear focus on “picking the winner”, 
this approach does not promise to be the most effective and efficient. Although a selective 
subsidization of likely winners might minimize substitution effects, it runs the risk of 
enormous windfall gains: Likely winners will probably not only yield high social returns but 
also high private returns, rendering public policy intervention obsolete (Santarelli and 
Vivarelli, 2007). Furthermore, selective policy approaches coincide with deadweight losses 
resulting from screening and selecting procedures of eligible applicants (Parker, 2007). 
However, the subsidy allocation process can also mobilize co-operative innovative activity 
and enable learning effects for policymakers when it is organized as a contest of initiatives for 
self-organized co-operation in R&D (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005). 
The differences between subsidized and non-subsidized firms analyzed in this article 
constitute a selection bias. This selection bias is taken into account when matching procedures 
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are applied to evaluate policy effectiveness
9. These methods then facilitate causal analyses on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of support schemes which consider performance indicators 
like revenue, employment and survival. However, these effectiveness analyses focus primarily 
on private returns. They neglect the original rationale of the subsidization of private R&D, i.e. 
positive external effects. Realizing positive external effects effectively and efficiently requires 
the identification of projects that are privately unprofitable but socially beneficial, the very 
starting point of this paper. Policy strategies like “picking the winner” are simply approaches 




This paper has drawn on new survey evidence to verify whether R&D subsidies are allocated 
according to a “picking the winner” approach. We argued that policymakers and program 
officials pursue a “picking the winner” strategy to circumvent fundamental information 
problems in identifying projects which yield high social returns but low private returns and 
thus would not be realized (to the full extent) in the absence of subsidies. As hypothesized, we 
find that a high degree of novelty and being an academic spin-off increases the likelihood of 
receiving R&D subsidies. However, other ex-ante indicators of likely winners like founder’s 
prior ambitions, being a team start-up, previous patent experience and the amount of initial 
capital do not increase the likelihood of receiving R&D subsidies.  
These ambiguous results point to difficulties in precise policy targeting which, in turn, 
fundamentally question the massive subsidization of private R&D
10. Widespread 
subsidization lacks exclusivity and thus does not allow for the certification of good projects 
(as suggested by Lerner (1999)). Moreover, it absorbs the demand for R&D funds and, 
therefore, runs the risk of hampering the development of a market for private R&D funding. 
Our analysis is based on aggregate data on the receipt of R&D subsidies, i.e. we lack 
information on the take-up of particular schemes and we do not have information on the 
amount of the subsidy. Therefore, we necessarily mix up selectivity within and between single 
policy schemes and cannot distinguish whether selectivity is exerted by any differential extent 
of subsidization. Although these data limitations are a clear shortcoming of this study, the 
                                                 
9 Examining the same data set with propensity score matching in a companion paper (Cantner and Kösters, 
2009), we find a high impact of R&D subsidies on start-up’s employment growth and patent output within the 
first three business years. 
10 Additional R&D funds of 6bn Euro between 2006 and 2009 have been announced by the promotional 
initiative “High-Tech Strategy for Germany” (BMBF, 2006). Fostering R&D and technology-oriented start-ups 
is a stated aim of this initiative. The high public subsidization can be also seen in our sample: 43.6% of all R&D 
performing start-ups receive public R&D funds. 
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overall subsidy allocation should still be consistent with the pursuit of enabling R&D activity 
which would not be carried out in the absence of subsidies. Our aggregate data on public 
R&D funding thus offers unique insights into the overall subsidy allocation for a random 
sample. Nevertheless, it is the dispersed and continuously changing subsidy environment that 
impedes more precise policy insights. 
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